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TO TEST OR NOT TO TEST: ARTICLE I, SECTION 7 AND
RANDOM DRUG-TESTING OF WASHINGTON'S PUBLIC
SCHOOL STUDENT-ATHLETES
Kristi L. Helgeson
Abstract: In Vernonia School District47J v. Acton, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the
Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution does not protect the privacy interests of the
nation's public school student-athletes from mandatory, random urinalysis drug-testing. This
Comment argues that article I, section 7 of the Washington State Constitution provides
Washington's student-athletes greater protection than the Fourth Amendment and,
consequently, proscribes mandatory, random urinalysis drug-testing. It concludes by
providing parameters for student-athlete drug-testing programs that will pass state
constitutional muster.

In 1943, the U.S. Supreme Court announced its landmark decision,
West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette.' Upholding the
constitutional liberties of public school students, the Court said:
The Fourteenth Amendment . . . protects the citizen against the
State itself and all of its creatures-Boards of Education not
excepted. These have . . . important, delicate, and highly
discretionary functions, but none that they may not perform within
the limits of the Bill of Rights. That they are educating the young
for citizenship is reason for scrupulous protection of Constitutional
freedoms of the individual, if we are not to strangle the free mind at
its source and teach youth to discount important principles of our
government as mere platitudes.2
Over fifty years later, a very different Supreme Court handed down
the definitive opinion on drug-testing for the nation's public school
student-athletes. In Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton,3 the Court
held that random, mandatory urinalysis drug-testing of students wishing
to participate in public school athletics did not violate these students'
rights under the U.S. Constitution.4
Washington's courts have not addressed the constitutionality of drugtesting programs for elementary or secondary public school student-

1. 319 U.S. 624(1943).

2. Id. at 637.
3. 115 S. Ct. 2386 (1995).

4. Id.
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athletes under the Washington State Constitution.5 Should this issue
come before the Washington Supreme Court, the court could choose to
undertake an independent state constitutional analysis.6 The Washington
Supreme Court has often resorted to an independent analysiis when it has
been dissatisfied with the reasoning of the U.S. Supreme Court.7
Ultimately, Washington's courts are free to decide whether a studentathlete's rights are broader under the Washington Constitution than
under the U.S. Constitution as interpreted in Vernonia.8
Part I of this Comment reviews the current status of seaich and seizure
law as it relates to mandatory, random urinalysis drug-testing programs
in public elementary and secondary schools. This discussion focuses on
both the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution---particularly the
U.S. Supreme Court's recent decision in Vernonia School District47J v.
Acton-and article I, section 7 of the Washington State Constitution. 0
Part II asserts that, within the framework of the facts of Vernonia,
Washington's constitutional, cominon, and statutory law proscribes
mandatory, random urinalysis drug-testing as a condition to participating
in interscholastic athletics. Part III recommends parameters for studentathlete drug-testing programs in Washington's public schools.

5. However, in 1987, Judge Mattson of the King County Superior Court held that the University
of Washington's mandatory, random, collegiate drug-testing program violated the Washington
Constitution. O'Halloran v. University of Washington, No. 87-2-08775-1, Oral Opinion of the Court,
Superior Court of the State of Washington, King County (July 23, 1987), rev'd on other grounds,
856 F.2d 1375 (9th Cir. 1988).
6. See generally George R. Nock, Seizing Opportunity, Searchingfor Theory, 8 U. Puget Sound
L. Rev. 331, 352-54 (1985); Justice Robert F. Utter, Freedom and Diversity in a FederalSystem:
Perspectiveson State Constitutions and the Washington Declarationof Rights, 7 U. Puget Sound L.
Rev. 491 (1984) [hereinafter Utter, Freedom and Diversity].
7. See, e.g., State v. Boland, 115 Wash. 2d 571, 800 P.2d 1112 (1990) (responding to California v.
Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1988)); State v. Myrick, 102 Wash. 2d 506, 6813 P.2d 151 (1984)
(responding to Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170 (1984)); State v. Ringer, 101 Wash. 2d 686, 674
P.2d 1240 (1983) (responding to United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982) and New York v.
Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981)), overruled by State v. Stroud, 106 Wash. 2d 144, 720 P.2d 436 (1986);
See generally Nock, supranote 6, at 352-54.
8. See generally Nock, supranote 6; Utter, Freedom and Diversity,supra note 6.
9. The Fourth Amendment states, in part: "The right of the people to be sectxe in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
U.S. Const. amend IV.
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause ....
10. Washington Constitution article I, section 7 states: "No person shall be disturbed in his private
affairs, or his home invaded, without authority of law."

Random Drug-Testing
I.

PRIVACY AND THE PUBLIC SCHOOL STUDENT

A.

FederalLaw: FourthAmendment to the U.S. Constitution

The Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides a right of
privacy by prohibiting "unreasonable searches and seizures."" Fashioned
by the Framers of the Constitution in response to the evil of general
warrants," which the Crown frequently issued during pre-Revolutionary
times, 3 the Fourth Amendment generally requires that the government
procure a warrant predicated on probable cause prior to conducting a
search or seizure. There are few exceptions to this rule. 4
The Fourth Amendment is not implicated unless the search or seizure
at issue intrudes upon a reasonable, subjective expectation of privacy. 5
Consequently, privacy analysis under the Fourth Amendment turns upon
the "reasonableness" of one's privacy expectations. 6 Proceeding upon
these basic principles of Fourth Amendment search and seizure law, two
key Supreme Court decisions provide the framework for evaluating the
constitutionality of searches and seizures and drug-testing in the public
school environment: New Jersey v. T.L.O. " and Vernonia School District
47J v. Acton.'"
1.

New Jersey v. T.L.O: The School Search Exception and Students'
Legitimate PrivacyExpectations

While upholding the privacy rights of public school students, the U.S.
Supreme Court has recognized an exception to the warrant requirement

11. U.S. Const. amend IV.
12. A "general warrant" is one which does not specify the particular persons to be arrested, things
to be seized, or places to be searched. Black's Law Dictionary1585 (6th ed. 1990).
13. See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 624-29 (1886)); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S.
325, 335 (1985) (citing United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1977); see also Vernonia Sch.
Dist. 47J v. Acton, 115 S.Ct. 2386,2398-99 (1995) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
14. See, e.g., Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973) (border searches);
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973) (consent to search); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S.
752 (1969) (search incident to arrest); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) ("stop and frisk"); Camara v.
Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967) (health, safety, fire and similar "administrative" inspections).
15. See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
16. Id. at 360.
17. 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
18. 115 S.Ct. 2386 (1995).
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in the school setting. 9 In New Jersey v. T.L.O., the Court held that school
searches, conducted by school officials, may be "reasonable" under the
Fourth Amendment even in the absence of a warrant or probable cause.2"
However, school officials act as representatives of the state, not merely
in loco parentis,2 when carrying out searches and other disciplinary
functions. Consequently, the Court turned its attention to determining the
"reasonableness" of a given search by balancing the student's "legitimate
expectations of privacy and personal security"' on the one hand, with
the government's interest in maintaining discipline and school order, on
the other.23
Because Fourth Amendment protections are triggered only where
there is a "legitimate" expectation of privacy, 24 the T.L.O. Court first
considered whether students have such expectations in their personal
effects.2 5 Noting that "legitimacy" varies according to context,2 6 the
Court found that it is indeed legitimate for students to expect privacy in
their personal possessions while at school.27
The Court then enunciated a two-part test for assessing a particular
search's legality in the absence of a warrant or probable cause. First, the
action must be "justified at its inception," and second, the scope of the
search, as conducted, must be reasonably related to the circumstances
prompting the search. Where there are "reasonable grounds" to believe
that there has been a violation of either school policies or the law, or that
a search will discover evidence of such a violation, a search by a school
official will ordinarily be considered "justified at inception. '29 The
method of searching, however, must be "reasonably related to the
19. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 340.
20. Id. at 340-41. T.L.O. involved the search of a student's purse after the student had been
discovered smoking in the school lavatory, violating school policy. Id. at 328-30.
21. Id. at 336-37.
22. Id. at 337.
23. Id. at 339.
24. Id. at 338 (citing Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (1984); Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98
(1980)).
25. Id. at 338-39.
26. Id. at 337-38. For example, the Court noted that the need to maintain order in prisons results
in the prisoner's lack of "legitimate expectations of privacy" in the prison cell. [d. at 338. However,
the Court held that it is "not yet ready to hold that the schools and the prisons need be equated for
purposes of the Fourth Amendment." Id. at 338-39; see also Vernonia Sch. Dit. 47J v. Acton, 115
S. Ct. 2386,2404 (1995) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
27. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 338-39.

28. Id. at 341-42 (citations omitted).
29. Id.
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light of the age
objectives of the search and not excessively intrusive 3in
0
and sex of the student and the nature of the infraction.,
Although the Court specifically declined to decide whether this rule
requires individualized suspicion in determining "reasonableness," '3' in
dictum the Court intimated that individualized suspicion is typically
required except where the privacy interests involved are "minimal" and
the intrusiveness of the search is buffered by "other safeguards. 32 The
Court also noted that "the reasonableness standard should ensure that the
to achieve
interests of students will be invaded no more than is necessary
33
the legitimate end of preserving order in the schools.
In Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton, the Court built upon T.L.O.
by evaluating the contours of the "legitimate" privacy interests of
students. 34 In particular, the Court held that given the student-athlete's
"decreased expectation of privacy," mandatory, random urinalysis drugtesting did not violate the Fourth Amendment.35
2.

Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton: The Facts

The specific facts of Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton were
central to the Court's rationale. 36 There was a perception that there was a
severe drug problem in the district and that student-athletes were the
ring-leaders of this problem.37 Teachers and school officials noted
increased disciplinary problems. Students began "glamorizing" drug use
in school assignments and in discussions overheard by teachers,
counselors, coaches, and other school officials. The district first
responded to this "problem" with special classes and speakers regarding
the deleterious effects of drug use. A drug-sniffing dog was also
employed.38
Noting no changes in behavioral and disciplinary problems, school
officials obtained parental input and then implemented the mandatory,
30.
31.
32.
33.

Id. at 342.
Id. at 342 n.8.
Id.
Id. at 343 (emphasis added).

34. Vemonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 115 S.Ct. 2386,2392-93 (1995).
35. Id. at 2396.
36. The facts involved in Vernonia are discussed at length in the opinion of the Supreme Court,
id. at 2388-90, in the opinion of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, 23 F.3d 1514, 1516-17 (9th
Cir. 1994), and in the district court's opinion, 796 F. Supp. 1354, 1356-59 (D. Or. 1992).
37. Vernonia, 115 S.Ct. at 2388.
38. Id. at 2389.

Washington Law Review

Vol. 71:797, 1996

random drug-testing program at issue. The program required all students
wishing to participate in interscholastic athletics to sign a testing consent
form. Students were also required to provide prescription information in
the form of either a copy of the prescription or a doctor's authorization.
Parents were required to give written consent to the testing program. If
either parent or student refused consent, the student was denied
participation in athletics until consent was given.39
Once consent was secured, the testing program began. All studentathletes were tested at the beginning of the sport seasons in which they
participated. Additionally, once each week ten percent of the season's
athletic participants were randomly selected for testing that day. A
student selected for testing received an assigned specimen control
number and was then tested in an empty locker room, accompanied by a
same sex adult monitor, typically a coach or other school official. Male
athletes were monitored with their backs to the school official, standing
at a urinal, fully clothed, while female athletes produced their sample in
an enclosed bathroom stall. The adult monitor listened for sounds of
normal urination, checked each sample for temperature and tampering,
and then transferred the sample to a testing vial. The samples were then
sent to an independent laboratory and were tested for amphetamines,
cocaine, marijuana and alcohol. As a matter of course, the school's
testing program did not request that the laboratory screen for steroids.
However, additional drugs could be screened at the distxict's request.
This additional screening, when requested, was not based upon the
identity of a particular student. Results were reported to be 99.94 percent
accurate.4 °
Once the sample was tested, the test results were mailed to the
district's superintendent. Test results were also released by phone to the
district's superintendent, principals, vice-principals, and athletic
directors, provided that an authorization code was confirmed. The results
were kept for one year. Positive tests were followed by a second test.4' If
the second test was negative, no further action was taken; if positive, the
athlete's parents were notified, the principal met with the student and his
or her parents, and the student chcse either participation in a six-week
drug program including weekly urinalysis, or suspension from athletic
participation for the remainder of the current season and the next season.
Prior to the next season of eligibility, the student was then ":estedagain as
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 2390.
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were all other participating students. However, a second offense
automatically resulted in the suspension option, and a third offense
resulted in suspension from the current season plus suspension for the
next two seasons.42
James Acton wanted to play junior high school football. Although
James was not suspected of drug or alcohol abuse, he was required to
submit to testing as a condition of participating in school athletics.
Because he and his parents refused to sign the district's consent forms,
James was denied the opportunity to participate. 43
3.

Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton: The Three-PartTest

In Vernonia, the Court employed a three-part analysis to determine
whether the Fourth Amendment recognizes and protects a particular
asserted privacy interest and whether such interest is violated by the
State: (1) the nature of the privacy interest upon which the search at issue
intrudes;' (2) the character, or degree, of the intrusion; 45 and (3) the
nature and immediacy of the governmental
concern and the efficacy of
46
the chosen means for meeting it.
The Court applied the first prong of the test and found that central to
determining the legitimacy of a student-athlete's privacy interest was that
while in school, children are under the temporary custody of the state.47
Modifying T.L. 0. 's recognition of legitimate privacy interests of students
while in school, the Court found that student-athletes have a "reduced
expectation of privacy" and "have reasons to expect intrusions upon
normal rights and privileges, including privacy."4' 8

42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.. at 2391. This is essentially the "legitimate expectations of privacy" analysis presented in
T.L.O. See supra part I.A.I.
45. Id. at 2393.

46. Id. at 2394.
47. Id. at 2391.
48. Id. at 2393. Speaking for the majority, Justice Scalia said:
Fourth Amendment rights ...are different in public schools than elsewhere ....For their own
good and that of their classmates, public school children are routinely required to submit to
various physical examinations, and to be vaccinated against various diseases....
...Legitimate

privacy expectations are even less with regard to student-athletes. School sports
are not for the bashful. They require "suiting up" before each practice or event, and showering
and changing afterwards.
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Applying the second prong of the test, the Court identified two aspects
of Vernonia's drug-testing program that were potentially intrusive: (a)
the method of monitoring the production of the urine sample;49 and (b)
the information produced by the urinalysis. 0 The Court :recognized that
students have an interest in both intrusions, but determined that given the
school district's procedures, "the invasion of the privacy was
insignificant."'"
Under the third prong of the test, the Vernonia Court declined to
require the school district to demonstrate a compelling concern. 2 Rather,
in the school setting, the Court framed the "compelling state interest"
standard as one which is "important enough to justify the particular
search at hand, in light of other factors which show the search to be
relatively intrusive upon a genuine expectation of privacy." 3 Under this
standard, the Court found Vernonia's policy to be "reasonable and hence
constitutional. 54
4.

A "Reasonable" Search Need Not Be the "LeastIntrusive" Search

In Vernonia, the Court declined to hold that only the "least intrusive"
search is reasonable for purposes of the Fourth Amendment. 5 Unlike the
T.L.O. Court, which expressly declined to decide whether individualized
suspicion was required, the Vernonia Court specifically rejected the
argument that suspicion-based drug-testing was required by the Fourth
Amendment. Indeed, the Court upheld the school district's program as an
effective and appropriate means for insuring that student-athletes do not
use drugs.56 Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia's reasoning focused
upon the assumption that suspicion-based drug-testing would place
By choosing to "go out for the team," they voluntarily subject themselves to a degree of
regulation even higher than that imposed on students generally.
...

Id. at 2392-93.
49. Id. at 2393 (citing Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 626 (1989)
(upholding suspicionless drug-testing of railroad personnel involved in accident-,,)).
50. Id. (citing Skinner,489 U.S. at 617).
51. Id. at 2393-94.
52. However, the Court recognized that in previous drug-testing cases it had characterized the
governmental interest as "compelling." Id. at 2394 (citing Skinner, 489 U.S. at 628; National
Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 670 (1989) (upholding suspicionless drugtesting of federal customs officers carrying arms or involved in drug enforcement)).
53. Id. at 2394-95.
54. Id. at 2396.
55. Id. (citing Skinner,489 U.S. at 629, n.9).
56. Id. at 2395-96.
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impracticable burdens on school teachers to detect drug use by students,
"a task for which they are ill prepared."57 Rather, the Court speculated
that suspicion-based testing might be more intrusive rather than less so."
B.

Washington State Law: Article I, Section 7 of the Washington
Constitution

Article I, section 7 of the Washington Constitution is the state's
counterpart to the Fourth Amendment. It reads: "No person shall be
disturbed in his private affairs, or his home invaded, without authority of
law."59 Whereas a privacy analysis under the Fourth Amendment turns
upon the "reasonableness" of one's "expectations of privacy,"6 the
article I section 7 "private affairs" analysis turns upon "those privacy
interests which citizens of this state have held, and should be entitled to
hold, safe from governmental trespass absent a warrant.",6' Thus, when
conducting a private affairs analysis, Washington courts will focus upon
whether an individual's private affairs have been unreasonably invaded
by the government, rather than whether the person's "expectation of
privacy," is "reasonable" or legitimate. 2
Washington courts have continually recognized that article I, section 7
may provide greater protection than the Fourth Amendment. 63 However,
before a Washington court may find that the Washington Constitution
provides greater privacy protection than the Fourth Amendment, it must
57. Id. at 2396.
58. Id. Justice Scalia was concerned with teachers, likely to be personally acquainted with
students, accusing students of drug use, and the resulting "badge of shame." Id. In her dissent,
Justice O'Connor criticized this reasoning, noting that the harm of false accusations can be
minimized by efforts to keep suspicion-based testing confidential. Id. at 2402-03 (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting).
59. Wash. Const art. 1, § 7; see supra note 9.
60. See supranotes 15-16 and accompanying text.
61. State v. Myrick, 102 Wash. 2d 506, 510-11, 688 P.2d 151, 153-54 (1984); cf Nock, supra
note 6, at 365-67 (recognizing significant difference between two approaches, but arguing that this
alternative approach, as it has been applied by Washington courts, has "no real difference"). For a
comprehensive discussion of Fourth Amendment and article I, section 7 search and seizure analysis,
see Justice Robert F. Utter, Survey of Washington Search and Seizure Law, 9 U. Puget Sound L.
Rev. 1 (1985) [hereinafter Utter, Search and Seizure Law]; Justice Robert F. Utter, Survey of
Washington Search and Seizure Law: 1988 Update, 11 U. Puget Sound L. Rev. 411 (1988)
[hereinafter Utter, 1988 Update].
62. State v. Boland, 115 Wash. 2d 571, 580, 800 P.2d 1112, 1116 (1990). The result is a broader
inquiry than the Fourth Amendment's "reasonable expectation of privacy" inquiry. State v. Young,
123 Wash. 2d 173, 181, 867 P.2d 593, 597 (1994); see also Utter, Search and Seizure Law, supra
note 61, at 9.
63. See supranote 7.
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first make a threshold determination that an independent state

constitutional analysis is warranted. The following sections will examine
when an independent analysis is appropriate, and then address how

Washington's courts have applied article I, section 7 analysis to school
searches.
1.

Independent ConstitutionalAnalysis Under State v. Gunwall

To determine whether to undertake an independent state constitutional
analysis, and as a prerequisite to evaluating whether Washington's
constitution provides greater protection to its citizens than the U.S.
Constitution, Washington courts look to six non-exclusive factors
enunciated in State v. Gunwall:' (1) the textual language; (2) differences
in the texts; (3) constitutional history; (4) preexisting state law; (5)
structural differences; and (6) matters of particular state or local
concern.65 Although a party generally must brief all the Gunwall factors
66
for the court to consider an independent state constitutional analysis,
when a claimant seeks broader protection under article I, section 7, only
the fourth and sixth factors need be analyzed.67
When applying the fourth Gunwall factor, Washington courts will
consider the scope and nature of preexisting state law. 6 IFan issue under
review is one of first impression, such as random, mandatory urinalysis
drug-testing in Washington's public schools, the court nonetheless may
decide to undertake an independent constitutional analysis, especially

64. 106 Wash. 2d 54, 720 P.2d 808 (1986).
65. Id. at 58, 720 P.2d at 811.
66. See, e.g., State v. Olivas, 122 Wash. 2d 73, 82, 856 P.2d 1076, 1080 (1993); Clark v.
Pacificorp, 118 Wash. 2d 167, 192 n.13, 822 P.2d 162, 175 n.13 (1991); Bedford v. Sugarman, 112
Wash. 2d 500, 507-08, 772 P.2d 486,490 (1989).
67. State v. Boland, 115 Wash. 2d 571, 576, 800 P.2d 1112, 1114 (1990). Because both Boland
and Gunwall involved article 1, section 7, Boland adopted Gunwall's analysis of the first, second,
third and fifth factors. Id.; see, e.g., State v. McCrorey, 70 Wash. App. 103, 109, 851 P.2d 1234,
1237-38 (1993); Seattle v. Yeager, 67 Wash. App. 41,45, 834 P.2d 73, 75 (1992).
68. Gunwall, 106 Wash. 2d at 61-62, 720 P.2d at 812. The court stated:
Previously established bodies of state law, including statutory law, may also bear on the
granting of distinctive state constitutional rights. State law may be responsive to concerns of its
citizens long before they are addressed by analogous constitutional claims. Preexisting law can
thus help to define the scope of a constitutional right later established.
Id.
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where Washington's courts and legislature have examined related
issues.6 9
Under the sixth factor, the court asks whether a matter is of particular
state interest or local concern, or whether there appears to be a need for
national uniformity. 0 If the issue is local, it may be more appropriate to
analyze the issue under the state constitution."
Once the Gunwall factors have been properly briefed, Washington's
courts will proceed with an independent state constitutional analysis. The
following section examines state common, statutory, and constitutional
law as it relates to searches conducted in state public schools.
2.

Article I, Section 7 Recognizes the "SchoolSearch Exception"

Like the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, article I, section
7 protects Washington's citizens from warrantless searches and seizures
absent a showing of special circumstances.72 Washington courts, like the
federal courts, have also held that such special circumstances exist in the
school setting.73 Thus, the "school search" exception to the Fourth
Amendment and article I, section 7 permits school officials to conduct
certain searches on the school premises absent a warrant or probable
cause.74 Additionally, article I, section 7 requires that a search be
conducted under "authority of law."' Washington's courts will find
searches conducted without authority of law per se unconstitutional.7 6
This Comment proceeds upon the assumption that any drug-testing
policy implemented in the state's public schools would be authorized by

69. Id.at 66, 720 P.2d at 815 (finding sufficient statutory protection of telephonic and electronic
communications generally); Yeager, 67 Wash. App. at 45-46, 834 P.2d at 75 (holding independent
analysis appropriate because Washington's courts had examined related vehicle stop issues).
70. Gunwall, 106 Wash. 2d at 62, 720 P.2d at 813.
71. Id. (finding that state policy considerations outweigh objective of national uniformity).
72. See, e.g., Seattle v. Mesiani, 110 Wash. 2d 454, 457-58, 755 P.2d 775, 777 (1988) (holding
city failed to demonstrate special circumstances under "authority of law" requirement of article I,
section 7).
73. State v. McKinnon, 88 Wash. 2d 75, 80-81, 558 P.2d 781, 784 (1977) (Fourth Amendment
analysis); State v. Slattery, 56 Wash. App. 820, 822-23, 787 P.2d 932, 933 (1990) (article I, section
7 analysis); State v. Brooks, 43 Wash. App. 560, 567-68, 718 P.2d 837, 840-41 (1986) (article I,

section 7 analysis).
74. See supranote 73.

75. See, e.g., Mesiani, 110 Wash. 2d at 457-58, 755 P.2d at 777 (holding warrantless searches
conducted under sobriety checkpoint program invalid under article I, section 7 because there was no
showing of "authority of law").
76. Id.
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statute or official school policy and, therefore, would meet the "authority
of law" requirement of article I, section 7.77
3.

School Searches Must Be Reasonable ConsideringAMl of the
Circumstances

In Washington, students may be searched by school officials without a
warrant or probable cause so long as the search is "reasonable".7 8 In State
v. Brooks79 the Washington State Court of Appeals adopted T.L.O. 's twopart inquiry for determining whether a warrantless school search is
reasonable: (1) whether the search is justified at its inception; and (2)
whether the search as conducted was reasonably related in scope to the
circumstances initially justifying the intrusion.8" The case involved the
search of a locker based on a student informant's tip that Brooks was
selling marijuana out of the locker and a blue metal box kept in the
locker.8 Brooks's teacher also believed Brooks to be a drug user based
upon reports by other teachers and personal observation." On these facts,
the Brooks court held that the search was justified at its inception
because there were reasonable grounds 3 to believe that the search would
reveal that Brooks was violating school policy. 4 Furthermore, the search
was justified in its scope because it was limited to the locker and metal
box." The court then declared that article I, section 7 does not afford
students any greater protection than the Fourth Amendment as
interpreted in T.L.O.86
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

See infra part II.A.
State v. McKinnon, 88 Wash. 2d 75, 81, 558 P.2d 781, 785 (1977).
43 Wash. App. 560, 718 P.2d 837 (1986).
Id. at 567-68, 718 P.2d at 840-41 (citing McKinnon, 88 Wash. 2d at 81, !58 P.2d at 784).
Id. at 564, 718 P.2d at 839.

82. Id.
83. The "reasonable grounds" standard has also been called the "reasonable belief' standard by
the Washington Supreme Court. See Kuehn v. Renton Sch. Dist. No. 403, 103 Wash. 2d 594, 595,
694 P.2d 1078, 1079 (1985). The two terms are used interchangeably throughou this Comment.
84. Brooks, 43 Wash. App. at 565, 718 P.2d at 839.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 568, 718 P.2d at 841. This announcement by the Brooks court is a:plicable to article I,
section 7 analysis only insofar as it encompasses the "reasonable grounds" requirement enunciated in
T.L.O. Furthermore, when evaluating whether the search was reasonably related in its scope to the
circumstances justifying the search, the Brooks court relied upon McKinnon and applied a more
extensive list of factors than the T.L.O. Court. Id. at 567-68, 718 P.2d 840-41. These factors were:
the child's age, history, and school record, the prevalence and seriousness of the problem in the
school to which the search was directed, the exigency to make the search without delay, and the
probative value and reliability of the information used as a justification for the search.
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Responding to Brooks, Washington's legislature enacted statutory
provisions permitting reasonable-suspicion searches of school-issued
lockers by school officials.8 7 Following the rules of both McKinnon and
T.L.O. for searches of personal effects, the legislature required that
searches of school lockers employ methods that are both "reasonably
related to the objectives of the search" and are not "excessively intrusive
in light of the age and sex of the student and the nature of the suspected
infraction.""8 However, this statute expressly denies students any right or

expectation of privacy in their use of school issued or assigned lockers.8 9
In addition to the locker search provisions, Washington law expressly
prohibits school officials from subjecting students to strip or body cavity
searches.9"
4.

Defining "ReasonableBelief." IndividualizedSuspicion and Less
IntrusiveAlternatives

Because Brooks involved a relatively minimally intrusive search based
upon individualized suspicion, 9' and T.L.O. declined to decide the issue
of whether individualized suspicion was required in warrantless school
searches, the Brooks court did not speak to the constitutionality of
searches conducted absent individualized, reasonable suspicion. Yet in
92 just four days before the T.L.O.
Kuehn v. Renton School District,
decision, the Washington Supreme Court held that article I, section 7
required the school official's reasonable suspicion to be particularized
McKinnon, 88 Wash. 2d at 81, 558 P.2d at 784. Although not all of the factors need be found for a
search to be constitutional, their complete absence makes the school search impermissible. Brooks,
43 Wash. App. at 568, 718 P.2d at 841 (citing Kuehn, 103 Wash. 2d at 598, 694 P.2d at 1081).
87. 1989 Wash. Laws, ch. 271, § 244 (formerly Wash. Rev. Code § 28A.67.300, recodified as
Wash. Rev. Code §§ 28A.600.210-.240 (1995)).
88. Wash. Rev. Code § 28A.600.230(2)(a), (b) (1995). But, where school officials wish to inspect
all student lockers, the statute permits them to do so absent prior notice or a reasonable suspicion.
Wash. Rev. Code § 28A.600.240 (1995). However, this license limits the search methods employed
by school officials for any containers found during such a general search, and reasonably suspected
to contain contraband, to the T.L.O. methods as codified at § 28A.600.230(2) (1995). See supra part
I.A.I. The statutorily permissible "random" search of school issued lockers has not been
constitutionally challenged in Washington's courts and is ripe for review.
89. Wash. Rev. Code § 28A.600.220 (1995).
90. Wash. Rev. Code § 28A.600.230(3) (1995); see, e.g., State v. Sweeney, 56 Wash. App. 42,
48-49, 782 P.2d 562, 565-66 (1989) (citing State v. Berber, 48 Wash. App. 583, 589, 740 P.2d 863,
867 (1987) (noting that society recognizes expectation of privacy in one's body, exposure of one's
"private parts" was "highly offensive," and finding strip search to be most intrusive search
imaginable)).
91. See suprapart I.B.3.
92. 103 Wash. 2d 594, 694 P.2d 1078 (1985).
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and encouraged the use of less intrusive alternatives to random
searches. 93 Thus, although school officials may conduct warrantless
school searches under the more relaxed "reasonable belief' of
wrongdoing standard, searches conducted absent "individualized
suspicion" are proscribed by article I, section 7.94
Kuehn involved a mandatory luggage search of all members of the
high school wind ensemble traveling to Canada on a voluntary school
concert trip. 95 Having had problems with student use of alcohol during a
prior excursion, school officials implemented the search policy." The
Washington Supreme Court found the policy unconstitutional, and held
that "[t]he general search is anathema to Fourth Amendnent and Const.
article I, section 7 protections, and except for the most compelling
situations, should not be countenanced."97 The court further concluded
that the reasonable belief standard required school officials to have some
basis for believing that each individual student searched would have
contraband in his or her luggage. 98 Thus, the absence of individualized
suspicion bars a finding that a school search is 'justified at its
inception." 99
In Kuehn, the court also found the search could not be reasonably
related in its scope to the circurstances initially justifying the search
(prior alcohol problems on band outings) in the absence of the McKinnon
factors."° Indeed, the court found that "[t]he factors prescribed in
McKinnon evidence the requirement of individualized suspicion."''
Without these factors, the search, as conducted, was not reasonably
related in scope to the school's interest in conducting the search in the
first place."0 2
In addition, searches lacking individualized suspicion may implicate
an impermissibly higher level of intrusion proscribed by article I, section

93. Id. at 599-601, 694 P.2d at 1081-82; sez also Utter, 1988 Update, supranote 61, at 582.
94. Kuehn, 103 Wash. 2d at 599-600, 694 P.2d at 1081.
95. Id. at 596, 694 P.2d at 1079.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 601-02, 694 P.2d at 1082.
98. Id. at 599-600, 694 P.2d at 1081.
99. See supratext accompanying notes 79--30.
100. See id. at 598, 694 P.2d at 1078; supranote 86 and accompanying text.
101. Id. at 599, 694 P.2d at 1081.
102. See id. at 598, 694 P.2d at 1081.
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'
7. 03

In Kuehn the Washington Supreme Court recognized that "an
important consideration in the weighing of public needs against
individual rights is the availability of less burdensome alternatives to the
intrusion."'" Since Kuehn, Washington's courts have held warrantless
school searches constitutional where the searches were based upon
individualized suspicion of wrongdoing.'
In contrast, the courts have failed to uphold random, warrantless
searches outside of the schoolhouse gates, largely on grounds that
random searches are unnecessarily more intrusive than suspicion-based
searches.' 6 For example, in Jacobsen v. Seattle,'°7 the state supreme
court held that a general search of rock concert patrons, primarily young
persons, was constitutionally invalid. Responding to recent dangerous
incidents at concerts-patrons throwing hard objects and bringing
explosive devices, weapons, and alcohol to concert events-the Seattle
Police Department subjected Seattle Center concert-goers to warrantless
searches as a condition of admission." 8 The court's decision rested
heavily on its belief that "other less constitutionally questionable actions
should be employed to control the behavior of [the attendees] . . .
Also, the City could "establish less intrusive and more formal procedures
for determining the presence of contraband."' Thus, searches conducted
by school officials absent individualized suspicion may suggest increased
intrusion and, consequently, fail the requisite "reasonable belief' for
school searches.

103. See, e.g., Seattle v. Yeager, 67 Wash. App. 41, 49, 834 P.2d 73, 77 (1992) (distinguishing
random sobriety checkpoint stops in Mesiani from individualized suspicion stop at issue, and
describing latter as less intrusive because search was based upon individualized suspicion).
104. Kuehn, 103 Wash. 2d at 600, 694 P.2d at 1082 (citing Jacobsen v. Seattle, 98 Wash. 2d 668,
674, 658 P.2d 653, 657 (1983)).

105. See State v. Slattery, 56 Wash. App. 820, 787 P.2d 932 (1990) (search of student's car and
locked briefcase in trunk based on informant's tip that student was selling marijuana to fellow high
school students); State v. Brooks, 43 Wash. App. 560, 718 P.2d 837 (1986) (search of student's
locker and box inside of locker based on student-informant's tip that locker and box would contain
marijuana).
106. The distinction is made between "intrusive" and "non-intrusive" searches because
warrantless searches of school-issued lockers are statutorily permissible. Wash. Rev. Code
§ 28A.600.240 (1995). However, locker searches are relatively "non-intrusive" when compared with
observed urination.
107. 98 Wash. 2d 668, 658 P.2d 653 (1983).
108. Id. at 669-70, 658 P.2d at 654.
109. Id. at 673, 658 P.2d at 656 (citing Wheaton v. Hagan, 435 F. Supp. 1134, 1145 (M.D. N.C.

1977)).
110. Id. at 675, 658 P.2d at 657.
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II.

ARTICLE I, SECTION 7 PROTECTS PUBLIC SCHOOL
STUDENT-ATHLETES FROM MANDATORY, RANDOM
URINALYSIS DRUG-TESTING

A.

Crossingthe Threshold:Meeting the Gunwall Factors

Although Brooks held that in the context of a locker search article I,
section 7 provides no greater protection than the Fourth Amendment
regarding school searches, this Comment asserts that Kuehn's
requirement of individualized suspicion for school-related searches
requires that random, urinalysis drug-testing of public school studentathletes be evaluated independently under article I, se.-tion 7 of the
Washington Constitution. The analysis that follows examines the
threshold requirements for independent state constitutional analysis"'
and argues that, within the context of the facts of lVernonia, it is
appropriate to analyze the legality of mandatory, random urinalysis drugtesting of Washington's student-athletes under article I, section 7 of the
Washington Constitution.
First, drug-testing of high school student-athletes satisfies the fourth
Gunwall factor: whether the issue has been addressed by Washington's
courts and legislature in preexisting state law."' Although such drugtesting will be an issue of first impression, Washington's courts have
reviewed related school and youth privacy issues under independent state
constitutional analysis." 3 The state legislature also enacted legislation
regulating searches of school lockers," 4 body cavity and strip searches," 5

111. Satisfying the threshold for arguing that the Washington Constitution provides public school
student-athletes greater protection than the U.S. Constitution requires a briefing of the Gunwall
factors. Specifically, a separate state analysis under article I, section 7 requir; that the fourth and
sixth factors are satisfied. See suprapart I.B. I.
112. State v. Gunwall, 106 Wash. 2d 54, 61-62, 720 P.2d 808, 812 (1986).
113. See, e.g., Kuehn v. Renton Sch. Dist. No. 403, 103 Wash. 2d 594, 694 P.2d 1078 (1985)
(searches of student luggage); Jacobsen, 98 Wash. 2d 668, 658 P.2d 653 (1983) (searches of rock
concert patrons, mostly youth); State v. Slattery, 56 Wash. App. 820, 787 P.2d 932 (1990) (search of
high school student's car and locked briefcase found in car trunk); State v. Sweeney, 56 Wash. App.
42, 782 P.2d 562 (1989) (strip search of Job Corps student); State v. Brooks, 43 Wash. App. 560,
718 P.2d 837 (1986) (search of student's school locker and box stored in locker).
114. See supranotes 87-89 and accompanying text.
115. See supranote 90.
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and general student health." 6 This legislative and judicial discussion
fulfills the objectives of the fourth Gunwall factor." 7
Because school government and discipline are matters of particular
local and state concern, the sixth Gunwall factor is also met." 8
Washington's constitution requires the state to provide an education to
all of its children." 9 Moreover, Washington's school districts are
separate political subdivisions of the state within the state's cities and
counties.2 Elected and appointed school officials create and enforce
school policies at the state and local levels.' Principals govern the daily
disciplinary demands of their student bodies," and teachers control their
own classrooms with an additional set of "policies" for student
conduct. 3 Having concluded that student-athlete drug-testing would
meet the fourth and sixth Gunwall factors, the analysis now turns to
article I, section 7 of the Washington Constitution.
B.

Article 1, Section 7 ProvidesMore Protectionfor Washington's
Student-Athletes than Does the FourthAmendment

The following section evaluates the constitutionality of a random,
mandatory urinalysis drug-testing program for Washington's public
school student-athletes under article I, section 7. The section begins by
asserting that such a program implicates the student-athlete's "private
affairs." It then argues that the mandatory, random drug-testing program
implemented in Vernonia fails the "reasonable belief' standard and,
therefore, cannot be "justified at its inception" as required by article I,

116. E.g., Wash. Rev. Code §§28A.210.020-.040 (1995) (visual and auditory screening
program); Wash. Rev. Code §§ 28A.210.060-.170 (1995) (immunization program); Wash. Rev.
Code §§ 28A.210.180-.250 (1995) (scoliosis screening program).
117. See supranotes 68-69 and accompanying text.
118. See supranotes 70-71 and accompanying text.
119. Washington Constitution article IX, section I states: "It is the paramount duty of the state to
make ample provision for the education of all children residing within its borders ... " Article IX,
section 2 provides in part: "The legislature shall provide for a general and uniform system of public
schools ... " See also Wash. Rev. Code § 28A.150.295 (1995) (stating that general and uniform
public school system shall be maintained according to article IX).
120. Wash. Rev. Code § 36.65.020 (1995).
121. E.g., Wash. Rev. Code §§ 28A.300.010, .040 (1995) (election, powers, and duties of state
superintendent of public instruction; Wash. Rev. Code § 28A.315.450 (1995) (election of school
district board of directors); Wash. Rev. Code § 28A.600.010 (1995) (government of schools and
enforcement procedures).
122. See Wash. Rev. Code § 28A.400.110 (1995).
123. See Wash. Rev. Code §§ 28A.600.020, .040 (1995).
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section 7. Consequently, Washington's school districts should avoid
implementing such random testing programs.
1.

UrinalysisDrug-TestingIntrudes upon a Student-AthJete 's"Private
Affairs "

There are at least two "private affairs"' 24 involved in evaluating
Vernonia's mandatory, random urinalysis drug-testing policy under
article I, section 7 that are particularly problematic: (1) the physical act
of urination, whether or not the urination is observed; and (2) the
information that must be disclosed prior to urinalysis testing.
First, the act of urination is a "private affair" that public school
students "should be entitled to hold, safe from governmental trespass."' 25
Although the Vernonia Court was not troubled by the prospect of high
school boys being watched from behind while producing a urine sample
for drug-testing,'26 Washington's courts do recognize a privacy interest
where there is no door on the stall. 127 Even the
in a public restroom even
2
8
"communal undress'
in the locker room cannot overcome the fact that
excretory functions are private affairs. Indeed, "[n]ormal locker room or
restroom activities are a far cry from having an authority figure watch,
listen to, and gather the results of one's urination. 129
Next, prescription and other medical information which must be
released as a condition of participating in the progran is also a
constitutionally protected "private affair." Although the right to
nondisclosure of personal information has not been recognized as
"fundamental," school officials must at least demonstrate that disclosure
procedures are carefully tailored and are no greater than reasonably
necessary. 3 ' On the facts in Vernonia, this standard was not met; the
district's policy failed to outline any safeguards for prescription

124. See supra notes 59, 61 and accompanying text.
125. State v. Myrick, 102 Wash. 2d 506,510-11, 688 P.2d 151, 153-54 (1984).
126. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 115 S.Ct. 2386, 2393 (1995).
127. State v. Berber, 48 Wash. App. 583, 589, 740 P.2d 863, 867 (1987). This rule has its
limitations; it applies to the proper use of a stall or urinal. Id. at 590-91,740 P.2d 867-68.
128. Vernonia, 115 S.Ct. at 2393 (quoting Schaill v. Tippecanoe County Sch. Corp., 864 F.2d
1309, 1318 (7th Cir. 1988)).
129. Acton v. Vemonia Sch. Dist. 47J, 23 F.3d 1514, 1525 (9th Cir. 1994), vacated, 115 S.Ct.
2386(1995).
130. Peninsula Counseling Ctr. v. Rahm, 105 Wash. 2d 929, 935, 719 P.2d 926, 929 (1986)
(under both Washington and U.S. Constitution, state had legitimate interest in disclosing patient
records to comply with federal statutory requirement to receive federal funds).
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information revealed prior to testing, let alone "carefully tailored"
procedures.'
Where parental consent is involved, the issue may be even more
problematic. For example, in Washington, young women are able to
obtain contraception services without parental consent. 32 It is possible,
then, that female student-athletes may be prescribed birth control pills
without parental knowledge or approval. However, a drug-testing
program which mandates both student and parental consent unfairly
requires a student to disclose a truly private affair--her decisions
regarding birth control. The Washington Constitution should be
interpreted to give public school student-athletes a right to avoid
mandatory disclosure of such personal and potentially revealing and
embarrassing information. Accordingly, Washington courts should not
merely dismiss this governmental intrusion as insignificant.
2.

Mandatory, Random UrinalysisDrug-TestingFailsthe Reasonable
BeliefStandard

Having concluded that urinalysis drug-testing pertains to "private
affairs," the analysis now turns to the reasonableness of the search.'3 3 In
Washington, a school search must meet two criteria before it will be
permissibly "reasonable" for article I, section 7 purposes. According to
T.L.O.,' 34 which Washington courts have followed,'3 5 the search must
first be justified at its inception; and second, the search must be
reasonably related in scope to the circumstances initially justifying the
search. 136
In order to pass the first part of the T.L.O. test, school officials must
meet the "reasonable belief' standard. 37 However, Washington case law
adds an additional wrinkle to this rule; where there is no individualized
suspicion, a search cannot be justified at its inception. 3 8 Therefore,

13 1. Vernonia, I15 S. Ct. at 2394.
132. Washington State Dep't of Health, Reproductive Health Legal Issues (1989) (on file with the
Washington Law Review).
133. See supraparts I.B.3. and I.B.4.
134. 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
135. See supra part I.B.3.
136. See supra parts I.A.1. and I.B.3.
137. See supra part I.B.4.
138. See supra part I.B.4.
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Washington's courts should hold that, absent individualized suspicion,
mandatory urinalysis drug-testing is not reasonable.
In Vernonia, Justice Scalia expanded the Court's school search
exception enunciated in T.L.O. and held that the Fourth Anendment did
not require individualized suspicion. 3 9 The Vernonia Court went even
further to insist that drug-testing based upon individualized suspicion
could be more, rather than less, intrusive 4 ' and that teachers were illsuited to identify potential student drug abuse.'
The reasoning in Vernonia, from the vantage of Washington
constitutional law, is unsatisfactory because it permits school officials to
conduct intrusive searches absent individualized suspicion. In Kuehn, the
state supreme court held:
When school officials search large groups of students solely for the
purpose of deterring disruptive conduct and without any suspicion
the search does not meet the
of each individual searched,
42
reasonable belief standard.
A school mandated search of student-athletes, solely fbr the purpose
of deterring drug use and without individualized suspicion, fails the
"reasonable belief' standard for warrantless school searches.
Washington's courts have found relatively non-intrasive searches
unconstitutional where such searches were conducted absent
individualized suspicion. For example, in Jacobsen the court invalidated
warrantless "pat down" searches at rock concerts, even though there were
legitimate safety concerns involved. Emphasizing that most of the
concert-goers were youth, the court said that "the damage to the
understanding of constitutional guaranties of freedom frora unreasonable
searches on the part of these young persons is incalculable."'"
Consequently, the court encouraged implementing less intrusive
procedures. Similarly, in Kuehn the court invalidated the random search
139. Vemonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 115 S.Ct. 2386, 2391 (1995). The T.L.O. Court, however,
explicitly refused to decide this issue. See supra part 1.A.I. In dictum, the Court noted that
exceptions to the individualized suspicion requirement are typically allowed only when the privacy
concerns are minimal and there are other safeguards in place to protect the individual's reasonable
expectation of privacy. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325,342 n.8 (1985).
140. Vernonia, 115 S.Ct. at 2396.
141. Id. Ironically, it was the very observation by school teachers and coach,-s that led Vernonia
School District to enact the mandatory drug-testing program at issue, priol to any attempt to
dissenting).
implement a suspicion-based program. Id. at 2403 (O'Connor, J.,
142. Kuehn v. Renton Sch. Dist. No. 403, 103 Wash. 2d 594, 595, 694 P.2d 1078, 1079 (1985).
143. Jacobsen v. Seattle, 98 Wash. 2d 668, 658 P.2d 653 (1983); see supra pmt I.B.4.
144. Id. at 674, 658 P.2d at 657.
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of student luggage, a policy also based on previous disciplinary
problems. 4 '
Compared to "pat down" searches at rock concerts and luggage
searches, a urinalysis drug-test is significantly more intrusive. Especially
intrusive is a testing regime involving monitored urination, at school, by
familiar school officials.'4 6 If less intrusive means are required for
deterring violence at rock concerts, so ought less intrusive means be
employed for deterring drug use among student-athletes. Even the T.L.O.
Court asserted that "the reasonableness standard should ensure that the
interests of students will be invaded no more than is necessary to achieve
the legitimate end of preserving order in the schools."'47 This is
especially true where the consequences of non-compliance, although not
associated with criminal liability, are potentially severe. For example, a
public school student's athletic experience may be the crucial beginnings
of an athletic career or may provide much needed funding for a student's
college education. Whatever the benefits of athletic participation,
however, under the Washington Constitution, "the mere announcement
that a constitutional right must be waived in order48to participate in the
school activity cannot make the search reasonable."'
Ultimately, a search will never be reasonable if it is not predicated on
a particularized suspicion. Consequently, there is no need to examine the
second prong of the McKinnon-T.L.O. test, the search's scope. Whatever
the scope of the search, it cannot be justified if school officials lack
individualized suspicion. This is the hallmark of Washington's
constitutional protection for youth, embodied in the uniquely defined
sanctity of the "private affairs" provision of article I, section 7.
III.

RECOMMENDED PARAMETERS OF STUDENT-ATHLETE
DRUG-TESTING PROGRAMS IN WASHINGTON

Does this analysis preclude Washington's public schools from all
drug-testing of student-athletes? To the contrary, drug-testing may be
permissible in certain circumstances. This section addresses alternatives
to mass, suspicionless drug-testing of students. In particular, two types of
drug-testing programs would comply with the requirements of article I,
section 7: voluntary testing and testing based upon individualized,
145. Kuehn, 103 Wash. 2d 594, 694 P.2d 1078.
146. See infra note 143.
147. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 343 (1985).
148. Kuehn, 103 Wash. 2d at 600, 694 P.2d at 1082.
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reasonable suspicion. Because these programs must be conducted with
the student-athlete's "private affairs" in mind, 49 drug-testing ought to be
conducted with an eye for minimizing governmental intrusion into the
private affairs involved. Both voluntary and suspicion-based programs
overcome the constitutional infirmities of Vernonia's mandatory, random
program and provide Washington's school officials a more appropriate
means for deterring drug use.
A.

Voluntary UrinalysisDrug-Te.ting

Under both the Fourth Amendment and article I, secticn 7, searches,
no matter how intrusive, may be conducted when the subject of the
search consents. 5 This consent must be voluntary; that is, it must not be
coerced.' In the school drug-testing context, a search is voluntary
provided athletic participation is not conditioned upon submitting to the
"voluntary" drug-testing program. Ultimately, a truly voluntary drugtesting program would clearly pass constitutional muster.
B.

Testing Should Be Based Upon Reasonable, Individualized
Suspicion

If a school district determines there is reliable evidence of widespread
drug use among student-athletes, and chooses to implement a testing
program, the drug-testing policy should, at a minimum, be based on
reasonable, individualized suspicion. Once a program is properly based
on particularized suspicion, it must meet the McKinnon-TL.0. factors;
the scope and nature of the testing program must not be excessively
intrusive given the age and sex of the student and the nature of the
suspected infraction."'5 2
C.

Less IntrusiveMeans of ConductingTesting Should Be Employed

School officials should also limit the intrusiveness of a suspicionbased testing regime by having all testing handled by an independent
party. Instead of school officials observing the urinating student or
149. See supranotes 56, 58 and accompanying text.
150. See State v. Hashman, 46 Wash. App. 211, 214, 729 P.2d 651, 654 (1986) (citing
Washington v. Chrisman, 455 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1982)).
151. See Acton v. Vemonia Sch. Dist. 47J, 23 F.3d 1514, 1526-27 (9th Cir. 1994), vacated, 115
S. Ct. 2386 (1995). The court noted that a "no testing, no playing" policy was not truly voluntary.
152. See supranote 88 and accompanying text.
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checking for tampering, for example, the sample collection should be
supervised by non-school officials and preferably at some location other
than the school grounds." 3 This would avoid the problem of the student's
urination being observed by someone who the student knows personally
and with whom the student must interact in a subordinate relationship.
D.

Scope of DisclosureShould Be Limited

Vernonia School District's testing policy involved carefully defined
parameters regarding the confidentiality and chain of custody of test
results.' 54 These same procedures should be acceptable in Washington.
However, there should be equally protective and narrowly tailored
procedures regarding the student-athlete's prescription information.'5 5
Although all students wishing to participate in Washington
interscholastic athletics must regularly obtain a physical examination,' 56
this should not summarily categorize a student-athlete's privacy interest
as "reduced' 57 and, therefore, vulnerable to governmental intrusion.
Rather, the procedures implemented in Von Raab... strike a balance
between a school's legitimate interest in maintaining discipline and
insuring safety in student athletics, and the student-athlete's right to be
free from governmental intrusion into his or her "private affairs."
IV. CONCLUSION
Washington's school search and seizure law is at a constitutional
crossroads. In the wake of the Vernonia decision, local school officials
153. National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab 489 U.S. 656, 672 n.2 (1989). In Von
Raab, the Supreme Court evaluated the United States Customs' drug-testing procedures and found
that, as a whole, the testing procedures minimized the intrusiveness of the search and were,
consequently, more palatable to the Fourth Amendment. The testing was conducted by an
independent contractor, the testing subject could choose to produce the sample from behind a
partition or within an enclosed stall, id. at 661, and personal medical information, such as
prescription information, was not disclosed unless a test was positive. Id. at 672 n.2.
154. See supra part I.A.2.
155. See supra part II.B.I.
156. Washington Interscholastic Activities Ass'n, 1995-1996 Handbook § 18.3.0 at 31-32 (on
file with the Washington Law Review). See also Odenheim v. Carlstadt-East Rutherford Regional
School Dist., 510 A.2d 709, 713 (N.J. Super. 1985) (holding that drug-testing policy that is solely
medical procedure violates student-athletes' reasonable expectations of privacy).
157. Vemonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 115 S. Ct. 2386, 2393 (1995).
158. 489 U.S. at 672 n.2. School officials concerned about this balance should not require
disclosure of prescription information until a particular student athlete has tested positive. Only then
should the prescription information be disclosed to an independent laboratory.
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may be tempted to respond to student disciplinary problems and
perceived drug abuse by implementing a mandatory, random urinalysis
drug-testing program. As this Comment suggests, however, this course of
action is very likely unconstitutional under the heightened protection of
students' "private affairs" secured by article I, seclion 7 of the
Washington Constitution. Ultimately, Washington's courts, legislature,
schools, and parents should seek policies which accomplish important
disciplinary, health, and safety goals without unnecessarily
compromising the constitutional rights of our public school students.

